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ABSTRACT
The importance of the sea in the current era of globalization has called all countries for 
managing their interests at sea as well as their common concern collectively, cooperatively 
and inclusively. By looking at the notions of the sea as a medium of connectivity and sea as 
a resource coupled with its vulnerability particularly in Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indo-
Pacific maritime cooperation towards global ocean governance accordingly are vital to the 
international stability, a successful of sea-based trading system and sustainability use of the 
oceans. Therefore, this article discusses the rationale of Indo-Pacific Maritime Cooperation, 
which made possible by the common concern of countries located between the Indian and West 
Pacific ocean maritime, the vulnerabilities of the region and the existence of various ASEAN’s 
mechanisms on Maritime Security Cooperation as well as regional regime and international 
law. Nevertheless, ASEAN needs to note some issues relating to its consolidation as well as the 
internal challenges in the realization of global maritime governance. 
Keywords: Maritime cooperation, ASEAN mechanism, global maritime governance.
Pentingnya laut di era globalisasi saat ini telah mendorong semua negara untuk mengelola 
kepentingan mereka di laut serta kepedulian bersama mereka secara kolektif, kooperatif 
dan inklusif. Dengan melihat gagasan tentang laut sebagai media konektivitas dan laut 
sebagai sumber daya ditambah dengan kerentanannya terutama di Samudra Hindia dan 
Pasifik, kerja sama maritim Indo-Pasifik menuju tata kelola laut global karenanya sangat 
penting bagi stabilitas internasional, keberhasilan sistem perdagangan berbasis laut dan 
keberlanjutan penggunaan lautan. Oleh karena itu, artikel ini membahas alasan Kerjasama 
Maritim Indo-Pasifik, yang dimungkinkan oleh kepedulian bersama negara-negara yang 
terletak di antara lautan India dan Pasifik Barat, kerentanan kawasan dan keberadaan 
berbagai mekanisme ASEAN tentang Kerjasama Keamanan Maritim sebagai serta rezim 
regional dan hukum internasional. Namun demikian, ASEAN perlu mencatat beberapa 
masalah yang berkaitan dengan konsolidasi serta tantangan internal dalam realisasi tata 
kelola kelautan global.
Kata-kata kunci: Kerjasama Maritim, mekanisme ASEAN, tata kelola maritime global.
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The sea has always been a major focus for mankind and international relations. 
Historically, the sea’s contribution to human development can be seen from at least 
four attributes, which according to Geoffrey Till are interlinked and interdependent. 
The sea becomes important for the resources it contained, its utility as a means of 
transportation and trade, its importance as a means of exchanging information and as 
a source of power and dominion (Till 2009). This role is increasingly significant in the 
current era as maritime becomes symbol of globalization for goods to be distributed, 
sold and consumed worldwide. This is not to mention the opportunity to further 
explore the sea as it has a lot of information and accordingly give greater opportunities 
for conducting marine research.
This article mainly focuses on the Indian and West Pacific Oceans as these oceans 
demonstrate the rising importance of the sea as a resource and as a means of 
transportation. The notion of Indo-Pacific is used here, as Hasjim Djalal, an Indonesian 
professor of law of the sea perceives that the Pacific and Indian Oceans are becoming 
the oceans of the present as well as the oceans of the future for mankind (Djalal 2016). 
The concept itself is initially used by Australian government in its 2013 Defense White 
Paper pointing at China and its relationship with the US, India, Japan, Korea, and 
Indonesia that have increasingly influence and military capacity (Australian DOD 
2013). On one hand, this can be positive contribution for the connectivity amongst the 
countries. On the other hand, the situation may increase the risk of destabilizing the 
regional security and peace. The notion also refers to Asian countries bordering on the 
Indian Ocean and West Pacific Ocean, which includes the 10 ASEAN countries located 
at the central of the two oceans. It is therefore this article argues that ASEAN, as a 
regional association in South East Asia region should be the driving force of the Indo-
Pacific Maritime Cooperation toward a global maritime governance.
By looking at White Defense Papers and Maritime Policy of states that locate near 
the two Oceans, notably China, India and Indonesia, this study discusses on their 
common concern, particularly that related to maritime issues and the mechanism 
that should be enacted to arrange their concerns and interests. From Indonesian 
perspective, President Jokowi has mentioned about vision of becoming the “Global 
Maritime Fulcrum,” which derives from the idea that in the geo-economic and geo-
political world shifting from West to East and with the strategic position of Indonesia, 
the Indonesian seas would have an increasingly important role (Widodo 2015). This 
maritime doctrine mainly clings on five pillars: (1) commitment to encourage the 
development of maritime infrastructure and sea connectivity, (2) commitment to 
develop services and industry of natural marine resources and marine environment 
management, (3) developing maritime cooperation through maritime diplomacy, 
(4) rebuilding Indonesia’s maritime culture, and (5) building maritime defense and 
security.
Almost at the same time, on one hand China introduced the Silk Road Economic Belt 
concept in 2013, followed by the initiative to build a close and strategic cooperation 
between China and ASEAN countries, particularly in maritime cooperation and to 
promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration through what is later 
known as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Road (Shaohui 2015). On 
the other hand, India has also intensively engaged its Asian neighbors by replacing 
its former “Look East” policy to a more active “Act East” policy, in which maritime 
engagement is a key component (Singh 2018). In addition, with a changing maritime 
security strategy from “Freedom to Use the Seas” to “Ensuring Secure Seas,” Indian 
government renews its maritime interests by looking at its geopolitical environment 
and the evolving of security dynamics in Indian Ocean (Indian Navy 2015).
With the abovementioned maritime strategic policies, this paper accordingly proposes 
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the Indo-Pacific maritime cooperation should be realized and supported toward 
a global ocean governance confirming the strategic and significance of Indo-Pacific 
oceans as well as to harmonize the various interests of states bordering the Indian 
and West Pacific oceans. To support this aim, ASEAN should be a driving force and its 
mechanism on maritime security cooperation coupled with regional and international 
regulations can be utilized. In this regard ASEAN is important, as the institution has 
become a primary driving force that is responsible to maintain peace, prosperity, 
security and stability, particularly in Southeast Asia and East Asia region. To deeply 
understand the issues, this paper will be divided into 4 (four) parts: (1) the introduction 
to give a brief overview about the Indo-Pacific maritime cooperation, (2) the rationale 
of why Indo-Pacific Maritime Cooperation matters, (3) the role of ASEAN in the region 
coupled with its maritime security mechanism, (4) and eventually this paper will be 
concluded with some recommendations.
The Rationale of Indo-Pacific Maritime Cooperation
Rory Medcalf, the head of ANU National Security College defines the contemporary 
Indo-Pacific as the economic and security connections between the Western Pacific 
and the Indian Ocean region, which creates a single strategic system (Brewster 2016). 
The system geographically expands and reaches China and India who have become 
outward-looking and military powers in line with the expansion of their economic and 
maritime interests. The notion also underlines the fact that Indian and Pacific Oceans 
have replaced the Atlantic Ocean as the globe’s busiest and most strategically trade 
corridor, especially in energy. Indo-Pacific strategic is currently emerging, connecting 
the Indian and West Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia, forged by the China’s rise 
and India’s more active engagement in Asia Pacific region.
The above statement also confirms that Indo-Pacific maritime has a very strategic 
position in connecting states and for Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC). 
Indian Ocean and South China Sea, passing the Strait of Malacca, is significant for 
transportation and connectivity as well as sea-based trading system. Stretching from 
Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca chokepoint in the southwest to the Strait of 
Taiwan in the northeast, the South China Sea is one of the most important energy 
trade routes in the world. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) confirms that in 2016 approximately 30% of the world’s sea-based trading 
and nearly 60% of oil products and global liquefied natural gas (LNG) travel from Strait 
Hormuz, Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca, to South China Sea. The oil products are 
delivered to East Asian countries as around 80 per cent of China’s oil imports, nearly 
90 per cent of South Korea’s and up to 90 per cent of Japan’s comes from Middle East 
and/or Africa and passes through Indian Ocean and West Pacific Ocean. 
The report from US Energy Information Administration (USEIA 2014) also justifies 
that more than 15 million barrels oil per day flowing from the Persian Gulf, through 
the Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, to Asian countries as well as 
the US. This report was based on Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Panama Canal Authority, 
Eastern Bloc Research, Suez Canal Authority, and UNCTAD. In comparison, the 
world’s most important chokepoint for maritime transit, the Strait of Hormuz between 
the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, had an oil flow of about 17 million barrels per day in 
2011. The number of 15 million barrels per day significantly increased from the last two 
decades. In 1993, according to the Center for Naval Analysis, about 7 million barrels 
per day of oil and petroleum products, which is equivalent to 20% of world seaborne oil 
trade, passed through the Strait of Malacca. The Strait holds important role since it is 
the main entrance and the shortest sea route from Persian Gulf to East Asian countries. 
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As mentioned earlier, the sea is important not only for its role in connectivity and 
sea-based trading system but also for the resources within for the benefit of human 
beings. Indo-Pacific waters, covering the Indian Ocean and western part of Pacific 
Ocean specifically Strait of Malacca, East and South China Sea, has an abundant 
inventory of natural resources that is surely advantageous for the littoral states. 
With regards to the abundances of oil and gas in South China Sea, there are some 
assumptions and estimation on the numbers of oil and gas undiscovered resources. In 
2010, for example, the US Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that South China Sea 
may contain anywhere between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 and 290 
trillion cubic feet of gas. The Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) was 
more optimistic to estimate the potential resources in South China Sea. Using their 
own research project, in November 2012, they estimate the area holding around 125 
billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Moreover, in 2013 the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) launched an estimation of approximately 11 
billion barrels of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves in the 
area. Although there is no precise number about the reserved oil and gas, the various 
estimations confirm the huge resources in western part of Pacific Ocean.  
In addition to oil and gas reserves under the sea, the abundance fisheries and other 
marine outcomes resulted from the sea in South China Sea certainly benefits states that 
locate nearby the sea. In 2010, for example, China’s total aquatic production reached 
more than 60 million tons from its EEZ (Economic Exclusive Zone), a significant 
increased from 47,5 million tons in 2004 and 7.5 million tons from 1999 (FAO 2011). 
In 2013, Chinese fisheries production reached 61.3 million tons and more than 13.8 
million tons aquatic plants captured from its maritime (FAO 2014). Although the total 
number of aquaculture production in 2014 slightly decreased, one can conclude China 
enjoys the biggest benefit of West Pacific waters. From below table, we can see the 
massive production of Indo-Pacific waters that brings profit to the South Asia, East 
Asia and Southeast Asia countries.
Table 1
Indo-Pacific Waters Fisheries and Aquatic Plants Production 2014
(in thousand tones)
No Countries Aquatic 
Animals
Aquatic Plants Total Aquaculture 
Production 
1. China 45,469.0 13,326.3 58,795.3
2. Indonesia 4,253.9 10,077.0 14,330.0
3. India 4,881.0 3.0 4,884.0
4. Vietnam 3,397.1 14.4 3,411.4
5. Philippines 788.0 1,549.6 2,337.6
6. Bangladesh 1,956.9 - 1,956.9
7. South Korea 480.4 1,087.0 1,567.4
8. Japan 657.0 363.4 1,020.4
9. Myanmar 962.2 2.1 964.3
10. Thailand 934.8 - 934.8
11. Malaysia 275.7 245.3 521.0
12. North Korea 64.2 444.3 508.5
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13. United States - 425.9 425.9
Source: World Fisheries Production (FAO 2016)
With its EEZ covering the Strait of Malacca and southern part of South China Sea, 
Indonesia gained more than 4 million tons of aquatic animals and more than 10 million 
tons of aquatic plants. This capture makes Indonesia became the second biggest 
country enjoying the benefit from South China Sea fisheries resources after China 
and followed by India from Indian Ocean with more than 4 million tons of aquatic 
animals and plants. Vietnam also enjoys the massive production of South China Sea as 
it gained nearly 3,5 million tons of fisheries, both captured and aquaculture fisheries. 
The Philippines gained more than 2 million tons of aquatic animals and plants in 
2016, while Bangladesh gained nearly 2 million tons of aquatic animals. The massive 
production of Indian Ocean and South China Sea undoubtedly becomes an endowment 
for littoral states. 
However, the globalized maritime emphasizes not only on sea connectivity and states’ 
economic development, but also on the increasing numbers of transnational crimes 
which mainly happen at sea. Such transnational crimes perpetrated by non-state actors 
that not only go beyond national borders but also have global impact. Thachuk and 
Tangredi (2002) distinguished the transnational crime actors into two types of non-
state actors, namely terrorist groups and organized criminal groups. Both groups use 
same methods to finance their organizations, which are intensely carried out, publicly 
targeted and globally directed, such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money 
laundering, human trafficking, and piracy. Terrorist attacks have also become an issue 
since some Southeast Asian states have to deal with radical and terrorist groups, such 
as in the case of Sulu Island in the Philippines and Sulawesi Island in Indonesia. 
Similar to terrorist attacks, piracy threats remained an issue for littoral states such 
as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. As reported by the International Chamber of 
Commerce International Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB), there were 513 pirate attacks 
in the Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Indonesian and Malaysian coastal waters from 
2003 to 2006 (ICC 2007). The piracy attacks in these waters were nearly 36% of all 
piracy attacks in all seas in the world. However, the ICC-IMB in 2011 reported that the 
number of piracy crimes in the Strait of Malacca Singapore, Indonesian and Malaysian 
coastal waters has dropped into 240 attacks in 2007-2010 (ICC 2010). This might 
happen as littoral states -Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore- has conducted joint 
patrol to protect Strait of Malacca since July 2005. Yet this numbers increased into 
453 incidents in 2011-2014 (ICC 2014). Indeed, the pirate attacks remain a concern for 
Asia Pacific states as nearly 25% of 180 global incidents of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in 2017, took place off the coast of Indonesia. Piracy against ships also 
occurred in Indian Ocean, as there are 26 attacks in 2013, 34 attacks in 2014, 24 attacks 
in 2015, 17 attacks in 2016 and 15 attacks in 2017 (ICC 2017). 
To assure the free flow of goods and to safeguard the oil and petroleum supply as well 
as to protect marine productions and sea territory, Indo-Pacific states then justify the 
development of their naval power. Along with the increased of economic prosperity, 
some states in the region transform their maritime strategy, modernize their military 
power and enhance their military budget. The 2015 Indian Navy revised maritime 
security and strategic perspective confirms this. The changing policy from “Freedom 
to use the Seas” to “Ensuring Secure Seas” deploys a holistic approach of its naval 
power and coast guard as Indian government recognized the rise in sources, types and 
intensity of threats, with some blurring of traditional and non-traditional lines. For 
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this purpose, the Indian government allows their Naval power to develop as a balanced, 
multi-dimensional, multi spectrum force, with a mix of ships, submarines, and aircraft 
with dedicated satellite and information system.
Similarly, China 2015 Defense Paper realizes that the threats for its maritime surely 
come from both state and non-state actors so that Chinese government plans to 
gradually shift its PLA Navy’s focus from “offshore waters defense” to the combination 
of “offshore waters defense” with “open seas protection.” As its economic has grown 
over the last decade, the Chinese authority allows PLAN to build a combined, multi-
functional and efficient marine combat force structure. This is to conclude that PLAN 
will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime 
maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive 
support (Chinese MOD 2015).
Nevertheless, Chinese PLAN modernization and a drastically increase in military 
spending with the justification of its security and defense have provoked similar reaction 
from the unhappy or being threatened neighbors. The lack of navies’ arrangement in 
the region has also become another concern, as there is no mechanism to supervise the 
naval power development of Indo-Pacific states. Regarding this, Rousseau argues that 
the weak position of one’s military power increases the perception of threat that leads 
to security dilemma and military competition (Ng 2005). In turn, military competition 
may trigger military alliances between major and middle powers, and intensifies the 
tension amongst Indo-Pacific states. This is true as in the case of Japan, Vietnam and 
the Philippines that have conducted joint military exercises with the US as they remain 
had problem with China in overlapping claims on East and South China Sea.
The importance of Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca and South China Sea for sea-based 
trading system and SLOC, the increase numbers of transnational crimes endangering 
the economic prosperity of Indo-Pacific states, coupled with vulnerability of security 
and stability due to transformation in maritime strategic perspective and arms 
dynamic in the region have become common concerns for Indo-Pacific states. This is to 
mention the US rebalancing strategy in Asia Pacific published by President Obama and 
continued by Trump’s administration, aiming to secure and protect its vital interest in 
the region, to continue their leadership in promoting stability and security regionally 
and globally and to safeguard the access to and the use of global commons through 
seas, not only for the US interest but also for its allies’ interests (US DOD 2012). 
In line with the US proposal, XI Jinping openly showed his interest in enhancing 
regional interconnectivity and economic integration as well as maritime partnership 
by launching the “Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st century Maritime Silk Road” or 
“Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) (Shaohui 2015) and therefore actively approaches the 
ASEAN member-states for the proposal. 
Similarly, President Jokowi has also mentioned about the vision of making Indonesia 
as the Global Maritime Fulcrum which focuses on five pillars namely to rebuild the 
Indonesia’s maritime culture, to maintain and manage marine resources, to develop 
maritime infrastructure and connectivity, to enhance maritime diplomacy and to 
develop its maritime defense forces (Witular 2014). Whereas, Indian government 
publishes its maritime strategy of “Ensuring Secure Seas” in preventing war and 
conflict in Indian Ocean, enabling maritime security in the sea areas of interest to 
India, and establishing an environment conducive for maritime interests and national 
economic growth and pursuing peace, stability and security in India’s maritime zones, 
neighborhood and other areas of maritime interests (Indian Navy 2015). In the era 
of globalization, common concerns on maritime interests inevitably call Indo-Pacific 
states for harmonizing their interests collectively and collaboratively.
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The ASEAN Mechanisms for Indo-Pacific Maritime Cooperation
The importance and vulnerabilities of Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Strait of 
Malacca coupled with its management is of common concerns for the Indo-Pacific 
States. Despite their different standing-positions particularly regarding the issue of 
East and South China Sea management, all countries in the region believe that maritime 
cooperation is vital in maintaining regional as well as global peace and stability. From 
their white defense papers, one can conclude that most of ASEAN states as well as the 
US, China and India want a cooperative and comprehensive integrated action and a 
series of confidence-building measures and self-restraint in achieving mutual interests. 
This part will essentially describe the important role of ASEAN in the realization of 
the cooperation and the need to arrange an inclusive maritime cooperation between 
ASEAN and its counterparts in Indo-Pacific region, mainly China, India, South Korea, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand and US.
ASEAN, as one of regional associations in Indo-Pacific region whose aim is to promote 
regional peace, prosperity and stability, has a great opportunity to facilitate and 
accommodate both major powers’ and its member states’ interests in Indo-Pacific 
maritime in such collaborative way. Although ASEAN was initially established to 
enhance the economic, social and cultural cooperation among its members as written in 
its 1967 Bangkok Declaration, security has greatly remained at the core of its existence 
(Severino 2006). Indeed, the former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew also 
mentioned in his memoirs that in its development ASEAN was banding together more 
for political objectives, stability and security (Yew 2000). This is true as in the case of 
South China Sea dispute.
As a contending issue between China and four ASEAN members namely Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, South China Sea overlapping claims 
have threatened the regional peace and stability as well as the economic develop-
ment. This situation justifies claimants to enhance their naval activities, in the name 
of territory and natural resources protection from both traditional and non-traditional 
threats. As far as regional peace and stability is concerned, ASEAN has played its role 
by discussing the issue in many summits and dialogues. The first workshop initiated by 
Indonesia was conducted in 1990 to manage potential conflict in the South China Sea. 
Afterwards, the issue of South China Sea and its management has been discussed every 
year in ASEAN’s leaders joint communiqués and Chairmen’s statements.
In 1992, ASEAN as a united posture eventually succeeded to bring China to sign the 
Declaration on the South China Sea, then followed by the 2002 Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea. Both agreements essentially called for a 
peaceful resolution of jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to 
force, the exercise of self-restraint, possible cooperation in maritime safety, marine 
environmental protection, search and rescue operation, action against transnational 
crimes and the application of the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as 
the basis for a code of conduct for the South China Sea dispute. This is also to confirm 
that ASEAN has become a primary driving force institution that is responsible to 
maintain peace, prosperity, security and stability, particularly in Southeast Asia and 
Asia Pacific region.
With regard to its responsibilities in maintaining peace, stability and security in the 
region, ASEAN also has several mechanisms where all members may have dialogue 
and consultation on common political and security issues as well as significantly 
contribute towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy. This is to mention 
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
(ADMM), ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
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Transnational Crime (AAMTC). Those are in addition to other ASEAN-led mechanisms 
such as ASEAN +3 (China, Japan, South Korea), ASEAN +6 (China, Japan, South 
Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India), ADMM Plus with Australia, China, India, 
Japan, New Zealand, South Korean, Russia and US, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
including the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS), ARF 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT-TC) 
and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). These forums are main forums for 
security and defence dialogue amongst ASEAN member states and between ASEAN 
and its counterparts.
To understand the work of ASEAN in maintaining stability, peace and security, 
including the maritime security, below table shows each mechanism and the area of 
cooperation:
Table 2
ASEAN Mechanisms on Security
Mechanism ASEAN 
Counterparts
Aims & Objectives Area of
Cooperation
ASEAN Foreign 
M i n i s t e r s ’ 
Meeting (AMM)
- •	To accelerate the 
economic growth, social 
progress and cultural 
development
•	To promote regional 
peace and stability 
•	To promote active 
collaboration on matters 
of common interest,
•	To provide assistance to 
each other in the form 
of training and research 
facilities 
•	To collaborate more 
effectively for the greater 
utilisation of agriculture 
and industries, trade, 
transportation and 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s 
facilities 
•	To promote Southeast 
Asian studies
•	To maintain close and 
beneficial cooperation 
with existing 
international and 
regional organizations
Various fields 
of cooperation 
including political 
and security, 
e c o n o m i c , 
social, cultural, 
technical, scientific, 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
fields, educational, 
p r o f e s s i o n a l , 
technical and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
spheres.
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ASEAN Defence 
M i n i s t e r s ’ 
M e e t i n g 
(ADMM)
- •	 To promote regional 
peace and stability 
through dialogue and 
cooperation in defence 
and security
•	 To give guidance 
to existing senior 
defence and military 
officials dialogue and 
cooperation in the field 
of defence and security 
within ASEAN and 
between ASEAN and 
dialogue partners
•	 To promote mutual trust 
and confidence through 
greater understanding 
of defence and security 
challenges as well 
as enhancement of 
transparency and 
openness.
Defence, military, 
h u m a n i t a r i a n 
assistance and 
disaster relief, 
p e a c e k e e p i n g 
operations and 
defence industry, 
maritime security
ASEAN Maritime 
Forum (AMF)
- •	To deepen maritime 
cooperation 
•	To promote maritime 
connectivity and 
maritime security 
•	To protect the marine 
environment 
Maritime security, 
SAR, safety 
of navigation, 
protection of marine 
environment, eco-
tourism and fishery 
regime.
A S E A N 
M i n i s t e r i a l 
Meeting on 
Transnat ional 
Crime (AAMTC)
- •	To enhance regional 
cooperation on counter 
terrorism
•	To undertake effective 
measure through 
deepening cooperation 
among ASEAN law 
enforcement agencies 
and relevant agencies in 
CT
Counter terrorism, 
including unlawful 
seizure of aircraft 
and civil aviation, 
taking hostage, 
unlawful acts 
against safety 
of maritime 
navigation and fixed 
platform on the 
continental shelf, 
terrorist bombings, 
financing of 
terrorism and 
nuclear terrorism.
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ASEAN +3 China, Japan, 
South Korea
•	To strengthen and 
deepen East Asia 
Cooperation
•	To work towards 
building an “East Asian 
Community”
•	To advance mutual 
understanding and trust
•	To enhance connectivity 
through the networking 
of multi-tracks and East 
Asia Forum (EAF)
Economic, social, 
political and others, 
such as combating 
t r a n s n a t i o n a l 
crimes, energy 
security, mineral 
c o n s e r v a t i o n , 
IT, biodiversity, 
climate change, 
education, health, 
and sustainable 
development. 
ASEAN +6 China, Japan, 
South Korea, 
Australia, New 
Zealand and 
India
•	To increase the capacity 
of the commercial 
potential 
•	To launch a free trade 
agreement in East Asia 
(CEPEA) and toward 
an Asian Economic 
Integration
Economic, trade 
and investment, 
and skilled labor.
ASEAN Defence 
M i n i s t e r s ’ 
M e e t i n g 
(ADMM) +8
A u s t r a l i a , 
China, India, 
Japan, New 
Zealand, South 
Korean, Russia 
and US
•	To strengthen security 
and defence cooperation 
for peace, stability and 
development in the 
region
•	To build capacity in 
addressing shared 
security challenges
•	To promote mutual 
trust and confidence 
through dialogue and 
transparency
•	To contribute to the 
realization of an ASEAN 
Security Community
•	To adopt greater 
o u t w a r d - l o o k i n g 
external relation 
strategies
Maritime security, 
counter-terrorism, 
h u m a n i t a r i a n 
a s s i s t a n c e 
and disaster 
m a n a g e m e n t , 
p e a c e k e e p i n g 
operations and 
military medicine.
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ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF)
A u s t r a l i a , 
B a n g l a d e s h , 
Canada, China, 
North of Korea, 
E u r o p e a n 
U n i o n , 
India, Japan, 
M o n g o l i a , 
New Zealand, 
P a k i s t a n , 
Papua New 
Guinea, South 
Korea, Russia, 
Sri Lanka, 
T i m o r - L e s t e 
and United 
States
•	To foster constructive 
dialogue and 
consultation on political 
and security issues of 
common interest and 
concern
•	To make significant 
contributions to efforts 
towards confidence-
building and preventive 
diplomacy in the Asia-
Pacific region
Political and 
security issues
E x p a n d e d 
ASEAN Maritime 
Forum (EAMF)
A u s t r a l i a , 
China, India, 
Japan, New 
Zealand, South 
Korea, Russia 
and US
•	To utilize opportunities 
and address common 
challenges on maritime 
issues 
M a r i t i m e 
security marine 
environment, eco-
tourism and fishery 
regime in East Asia
With regards to the above ASEAN mechanisms, particularly that deals with maritime 
issues we can say that ASEAN has built a comprehensive and inclusive way to enhance 
maritime connectivity and cooperation among the ASEAN countries coupled with its 
East and South Asian partners. Such mechanisms mainly contribute to a peaceful, 
more integrated and prosperous ASEAN within a stable, diverse and dynamic in East 
Asia and South Asia. All this ASEAN and ASEAN-led Maritime mechanisms have 
been conducted through discussion on comprehensive issues focusing on maritime 
security, safety of navigation, seas management and fishery regime as a way to 
confidence building measures. In addition, the forums have also discussed about the 
further cooperation including activities such as information sharing, technological 
cooperation, exchange of visits of related authorities, capacity building, infrastructure 
and equipment upgrading, seafarers’ training, marine-science research, marine 
environment protection, eco-tourism promotion, disaster relief, illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing countermeasures, as well as security at sea and ports improvement. 
In line with the ASEAN maritime mechanisms, we also recognized the importance 
of universally acknowledged principles of international law, namely United Nations 
Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLOS). This law is essential in providing a rules-
based framework for maritime security and cooperation in the region, as well as for 
addressing the issue of conflicting claims. With regard to overlapping claims, such as 
in South China Sea, we should also note the importance of the regional agreements and 
arrangements such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and the on-
going negotiated regional Code of Conduct (COC) between ASEAN and China on the 
basis of consensus.
Nevertheless, there are some issues that should be noted by ASEAN and its member 
states if they want to use the ASEAN’s mechanism in the realization of Indo-Pacific 
maritime connectivity and cooperation. First, with the existing of various mechanisms 
in ASEAN it seems there is duplication of the maritime-related forums, which 
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is considered overlap with multiple platforms. Although the discussions can be 
complementary, it is likely to pose a coordination challenge amongst the mechanisms 
as well as spend a lot of budget in various discussion forums and result in meeting 
exhaustion. It gives more complicated situation if the country has a lack of capacity of 
its officials to attend all of these meetings.
Secondly, with the central position of ASEAN coupled with is success story in 
maintaining peace, security and stability in the region, one can say that ASEAN should 
take the role as a driving force in Indo-Pacific maritime cooperation. However, it 
needs to readjust the priorities and strengthen its unity to respond the major powers’ 
interests. By this situation, ASEAN member states have to balance its national interest 
with regional and global interests. This can be more challenging since ASEAN is 
known as less-binding in its mechanisms with its “ASEAN Way” principles of non-
interference and the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external 
interference. The mechanisms can be fruitful to promote dialogue, consultation and 
information sharing. However, with the diverse interest of ASEAN member states, in 
the ASEAN led-mechanisms ASEAN can be a victim when it comes to major powers 
who are partners as well as rivals in international politics. 
Thirdly, one can say that the ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms work well when 
it is organized every year in many multilateral forums. In such meetings a number 
of agreement and joint-communique were produced which showed its triumph. 
Nonetheless it creates a problem when it comes to the domestic layers. The continuity 
of the maritime policies and officials that come to the forums due to regime changes 
as well as the coordination amongst the internal agencies can be an issue. The lack 
of coordination in addition to limited resources and human capital might limit the 
effectiveness of regional maritime security cooperation toward a global maritime 
governance. Therefore, to encourage the ASEAN mechanism on security to become 
a means to realize the Indo-Pacific maritime cooperation towards a global maritime 
governance, ASEAN and its member countries need to initially fix the above-mentioned 
challenging issues. 
Conclusion
The importance of Indo-Pacific region coupled with its maritime vulnerability call all 
countries in the region for realizing the regional and global maritime governance in or-
der to promote national prosperity and security as well as regional and global stability. 
As one of the regional organizations in Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN has a responsibility 
to facilitate and accommodate both its member states’ interests and major powers’ 
interests in Indo-Pacific maritime in such collaborative way. The ASEAN mechanism 
on maritime security cooperation can be a solution towards the global maritime gov-
ernance. Yet, ASEAN needs more time to consolidate amongst the ASEAN itself and 
within the ASEAN member states.
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